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nce a strong supporter of Turkey’s membership of the EU, I have come to the conclusion that 
the project is doomed. When we offered membership to the Turks some fifty years ago, the 
world was totally different. During the cold war, Turkey, a loyal member of NATO although 
a rather imperfect democracy, was strategically crucial for the west. Furthermore, in view of their 
troubled relationship, it would have been unthinkable to make the offer to Greece and not to Turkey. 
Twenty years after the end after the fall of the Soviet Union, the situation has changed dramatically. 
Not in the sense that Turkey is now less important: quite the contrary. It borders a part of the world 
that is even more explosive than it was fifty years ago. It has a buoyant economy largely integrated 
with that of the EU. Its democracy has considerably strengthened and the prospect of periodic military 
coups d’état has receded; indeed it is the only working democracy in a Muslim country. If that is so, 
what justifies my pessimism? If our relationship with Turkey was a play, its title could well be “The 
comedy of errors”. 
Europe made the promise of membership and then, absorbed as it was by other more pressing tasks, 
forgot about it. Turkey, although it knew that the process would be long and that its fate was linked to 
that of Greece, took it very seriously. The then ruling secular, westernised elite looked at Europe in 
strategic terms: membership of the European club was, along with the support of the military, the best 
guarantee for the preservation of their central role in Turkish society. They kept knocking at the door, 
becoming more insistent after the accession of Greece. The Cyprus mess made things more difficult, 
but they never gave up. Europe responded confirming the promise and making economic association 
deeper and deeper. This produced enormous economic advantages for both sides and it is without any 
doubt an asset that should be preserved at all costs. As far as full membership was concerned, Europe 
continued to dodge the issue often hiding behind the Greeks. Then came the massive eastward 
enlargement (that unwisely included Cyprus as well). Not to start formal negotiations would have 
amounted to a public declaration that the promise was void. Under the pressure of the United States 
and a number of member states, the EU thought that it had no option other than to go ahead. However 
a number of governments were deeply sceptical, if not opposed. They counted on the length of the 
process, believing that nothing is irreversible and hoped that they could postpone the day of reckoning 
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indefinitely. The tactic backfired. The mounting populist movement within Europe exploited the 
‘Turkish question’, using the demagogic but simple argument of a possible ‘Muslim invasion’. The 
argument had a certain impact on the French referendum on the constitution. An issue that 
governments had hoped could be postponed to a distant future had become an immediate problem. It 
is today an absolute certainty that the accession of Turkey would be rejected by a popular vote in a 
significant number of countries (the French are already committed to a referendum). The scenario that 
has been unfolding has sent the worst possible message to the Turks: they are rejected because they 
are Muslim.      
The whole debate was – and still is – complicated by the fact that everyone seemed to accept the basic 
assumption that the prospect of membership was a key instrument to ‘keep Turkey western’: a 
predilection that could not be taken for granted after the end of the cold war. It is this very assumption 
that I believe should be challenged, at least in its more simplistic formulation. Many years ago a 
friend of mine, a totally westernised Turkish banker, told me: “We, the secular elite, know that to use 
the military as an insurance policy is becoming increasingly difficult. We also seem to believe that by 
joining Europe we can make every single Turk like a citizen, if not of Paris and London, at least of 
Rome and Madrid. That is an illusion. Turkey has two souls: one secular and European, the other 
Asian and Muslim. To accept this ambiguity is our main challenge. If we fail, the country is doomed, 
irrespective of whether or not it is a member of the EU.” And he added: “I believe that if and when we 
manage to unify the country, we shall ourselves discover that we want to be close to Europe but not 
part of it.” At the time I didn’t take his words very seriously, attributing them to the gloom behind the 
persistent rumours of yet another military coup. In hindsight, I think they were wise. The problem is 
that Turkish democracy, as inherited from Ataturk, had some fatal flaws. It was meant to be secular 
and European, but it relied on the military. It wanted to join Europe, but nurtured nationalistic 
feelings, not only against the Greeks but also against all sorts of internal religious and ethnic 
minorities, particularly the Kurds. In addition, it was largely corrupt and inefficient. The secular 
political elite may have had a chance to make the country ‘European’, but missed it. 
In 2002 the moderate Islamic party AKP won the elections, has ruled the country ever since and is 
unlikely to lose power any time soon. In the meantime Turkey has changed beyond recognition. The 
modernisation of the economy has continued and a new class of Anatolian entrepreneurs has emerged, 
culturally different from the traditional Istanbul-based elite. The country is now fully engaged to draw 
all the potential benefits from its position as an indispensable crossroad for the transit of gas from the 
Caucasus and the Caspian region to Europe. Civil liberties have made some modest gains, including 
small steps in the direction of political freedom for ethnic and religious minorities. Some of the tenets 
of the secular tradition, such as the prohibition of the Islamic scarf, are being gradually challenged 
and eroded. The constitutional reform, recently adopted by a large majority in a referendum, will limit 
the power of the military. The changes are most visible in foreign policy. While maintaining its 
membership of NATO and pursuing the goal of EU membership, Turkey has also turned east and 
south, developing ties with Arab countries, Iran and Central Asia. The traditional alliance with Israel, 
although not formally renounced, is called into question. There are two interpretations of these 
developments. According to some – in Turkey as well as in the west – the AKP can be seen as the 
Islamic version of the Christian Democrats that have succeeded in reconciling democracy and religion 
in some European countries after the bitter confrontations of the 19th century. I haven’t heard from my 
banker friend recently, but it sounds like his dream is coming true. For others – mainly within the 
secularists in Turkey and many in the west – the purpose of the show of moderation by the AKP is 
only a gimmick to mask a process of deliberate Islamisation of Turkey’s society and a shift towards a 
foreign policy fully independent from, if not hostile to, the west. Relations with Iran are a particular 
cause for concern. 
Powerful forces are at play within the country, the outcome is far from clear and the fears should not 
be dismissed too lightly. Some, particularly in the US have started a debate that could be labelled 
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“Who lost Turkey?”, the blame being laid squarely on the doorsteps of the EU. It is an absurd, 
divisive and counterproductive argument. In the first place, the drift in Turkey’s foreign policy started 
well before clear opposition to membership emerged within Europe. The main turning point was the 
invasion of Iraq, when the US grossly underestimated its impact on Turkey’s strategic interests. Nor 
can Europe be blamed for the emergence of anti-Israeli feelings that are (at least for the moment) 
much more moderate than in any other Muslim country. In fact, what do we mean by not losing 
Turkey? If the answer is that we want to go back to the cold war status quo, with a country 150% 
aligned with the west and a secular ruling class firmly in control, we had better give up. That Turkey 
has ceased to exist and will not come back. Its posture should instead be assessed as that of another 
important emerging country that is struggling to find its place in a multi-polar world, sees itself as a 
regional leader, is tempted to set overambitious goals, learns by doing and in the process makes 
mistakes. The disaffection of Turkish public opinion towards Europe and, even more so, towards the 
US is real. However, both the concept of a drift towards the Islamic world and that of a ‘neo-ottoman’ 
strategy should be put in perspective. The Turks are too wise to fully believe their own rhetoric. More 
than any other emerging country, Turkey’s national interest requires a strong link with Europe. Its 
economy is largely integrated with ours. Furthermore, despite emotional feelings, history separates 
Turkey from the Arab world at least as much as it does from Europe. As for other aspects of the 
‘Ottoman dream’, links with the Turkish-speaking countries of Central Asia can be a useful bridge, 
but they are too loose and remote to provide for a strategic partnership. Turkey’s foreign policy will 
by necessity be a balanced one. Of course, either side could make mistakes that would transform the 
disaffection into hostility. The question is which policy is best suited to avoid this from happening and 
instead, to consolidate the relationship. 
The best argument in favour of full membership is the same that was used to support the start of the 
negotiations: it gives us more tools to influence the country’s domestic and foreign policy. It should 
not be dismissed too easily. It is the very raison d’être of the EU and has produced results in many 
cases. However, the process has its limits and there are doubts that it would work effectively in the 
case of Turkey. The present EU and its institutions are adequate to enforce European law and 
influence a member’s behaviour if the gap with the European mainstream is not too large. They are 
too weak to exert effective influence when the divergence stems from factors deeply entrenched in the 
country’s economic, social and cultural structures, or its history. The combination of enforcement and 
‘peer pressure’ has been (so far) moderately successful with Italy, Spain, Portugal and most new 
Eastern European members. It has been disappointing in the case of Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, 
and a failure in the case of Cyprus. The problem is compounded by the very nature of the enlargement 
process. The established doctrine is that candidates are required to accept and adapt to existing law 
and policies (the acquis). It says nothing about the future; once a member, every country has equal 
rights and obligations. Experience tells us that the negotiating process has its own dynamic. Beyond a 
certain stage, there is an almost irresistible rush to success. Candidates are in a hurry to conclude and 
tend to accept any request, planning to renegotiate once they are in; it has happened on more than one 
occasion. There is a moment when failure to conclude, or worsen to ratify, becomes a catastrophe to 
be avoided at all costs. The result is a painful process of adaptation from within that can in some cases 
paralyse the Union for some time. The obsession of the Brussels bureaucracy for legal precedents is 
such that they seem compelled to repeat past mistakes simply “because we have done the same thing 
before”. In the case of Turkey, its sheer size would make the problem much bigger and possibly 
intractable. What if the EU could, before enlargement, make a quantum jump towards more 
centralised political institutions? I fear that, even if the EU was willing to move in that direction, the 
paradoxical implication would be that the very reforms that could make Europe capable of integrating 
Turkey would lead the Turks to decide that they don’t want to join after all. 
The best term to describe the present policy of the EU is as if: things go on as if membership was still 
a credible prospect. Admittedly, it has its merits. It allows both sides to buy time. It avoids an open 
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confrontation within the EU. It preserves whatever leverage Europe has on the country’s domestic 
developments. The Turkish government also seems willing to sing to the same tune. Membership 
negotiations are a good argument to force reforms both on the opposition and on its own radical wing. 
It reassures the financial markets, Europe and the secularists that Islamism will not go too far. It is a 
policy of ‘national unity’. The fact is, however, that the AKP government is happy to justify reforms 
on ‘European’ grounds, but selects them according to its own national agenda. So far so good, but the 
approach has also serious shortcomings. It plays into the hands of the populist euro-sceptics in 
Europe. It feeds the disaffection towards Europe of Turkey’s public opinion that is not deceived about 
our real intentions. The two sides interpret in opposite ways the fact that negotiations are, if anything, 
stalled. In Europe most people are convinced that accession will happen, even if they don’t like it. In 
Turkey the message is one of rejection, masked by hypocrisy. By continuing to act as if, we dodge the 
critical issue: how to establish friendly and constructive relations with an independent, self-confident 
Turkey. Most importantly, this approach prevents the EU from at last accepting that enlargement is 
not the only – nor necessarily the best – policy option that is available to deal effectively with a 
strategically important country on its borders. 
Is there an alternative way? I believe that there is; it is difficult, but preferable to the present approach. 
The first step should be to declare the emperor naked and acknowledge that enlargement is no longer 
on the table. It is unlikely that the Turks would be the first to move; it is for the EU to take the lead in 
an ‘operation transparency’. The political implications would have to be managed with great care. In 
the first place, the EU should not drop the Cyprus problem, however intractable, and make a serious 
and determined commitment to find a solution acceptable for the Turkish minority. Equally, members 
of the EU should reassure Turkey that Greece would not be allowed to exploit its privileged position 
as a member of the club in possible future bilateral confrontations; and Greece should be left in no 
doubt about it. Common economic projects, particularly in energy, should be accelerated. Finally, and 
most importantly, the EU should engage alongside the US, in a serious dialogue with Turkey in order 
to reconcile the country’s perceived national interests with those of the west. It would probably be 
unnecessary, and possibly counterproductive, to invent institutional structures and grand names to 
define the new relationship; these may come later, when there is enough substance to justify them. 
What would be required is above all a serious, prolonged and sincere commitment, based on the 
recognition that Turkey is one of the main foreign policy priorities of the EU. 
It could be argued that there is another possible scenario, fully compatible with the as if approach. In 
the next decade the EU, despite the rhetoric of the Lisbon Treaty, may well continue to slip into a 
loose intergovernmental organisation, with few binding rules and weak central institutions, while a 
group of core countries may (or may not) push for deeper political integration. Turkey may well find a 
place in such an organisation, provided suitable arrangements could be found for problems like the 
free circulation of labour. In this case, the appropriate title for the play would be “Much ado about 
nothing”. As it happens, both of Shakespeare’s plays end well. However, it will take time for the EU 
to clarify the nature of its project. The time to bite Turkey’s bullet is now. If we fail to do so, the 
play’s script could change into that of “The War of the Roses”: a story of a divorce that grows 
increasingly bitter, in a way that neither side intended in the first place. 
 
